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Abstract 
This paper examines an industry whose incumbents’ specialised complimentary assets 
were their operations management and distribution channels. This advantage was 
seriously undermined by the advent of digital distribution. Radical technological change 
theories dictate that if incumbents in an industry without specialised complimentary 
assets will be replaced by entrants. This did not happen, and extant theories of 
incumbent survival do not explain why the incumbents remained dominant in the 
industry. We propose that survival is due to the unique industry characteristic of 
perpetuating sales. This paper will explain what is a perpetuating sales model and why 
does it enable incumbent survival? 
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Introduction 
Technological change can either sustain the competencies of existing firms or destroy 
them (Bower and Christensen, 1995). When a new dominant technology is sustaining, it 
incentivises existing firms to invest and it sustains the current trajectory of the industry 
(Arrow, 1962). When a technology is radical, it requires firms to acquire new 
competencies, causes current competencies to lose their value and incentivises entrants 
to invest (Gilbert and Newbery, 1982; Teece 1986; Tripsas, 1997). Existing firms, who 
are often entrenched in the use and routines of their old technological trajectory, find it 
difficult to transition to the new technology and entrants who can more easily adapt to 
the new radical technology replace them in the industry (Tushman and Anderson, 1986; 
Christensen, 1997; Tripsas, 1997). 
A body of literature has emerged, discussing how existing firms can prepare for such 
change and react to it once it occurs (Christensen, 1997; Jiang et al., 2010; Hess and 
Rothaermel, 2011; Tripsas, 1997; Tushman and Anderson, 1986). This literature has 
created exceptions where existing firms can survive these radical technological shifts. 
There are broadly three categories described in the incumbent survival literature- (i) 
specialized complimentary assets to the new technology that allow incumbents a 
competitive advantage on entrants. (ii) Strategic alliances with firms in different 
industries or different places in the supply stream that allows firms access to a wide 
array of competencies and (iii) R&D innovation which gives firms a wider frame of 
reference for new technologies. 
 
Research Question 
In this paper, we aim to add to the body of knowledge in the area of incumbent survival 
while also adding to our understanding of the broader theme of radical technological 
change. Currently, the main theories of incumbent survival of radical technological 
change state that it is physical and tangible assets, and intentional actions that allows 
survival to occur. We propose that incumbents can survive a radical technological shift 
by a perpetuation of sales in the industry, which is a characteristic that belongs to the 
industry as a whole and not to an individual incumbent, firm or firms. The phonographic 
(recorded music) industry is the research site for our study. In this industry, products can 
be perpetually popular with customers and therefore constantly bring revenue to firms 
in the industry. This phenomenon is unique to the industry itself and does not belong to 
any firm. Products can sell years after production and after the technological platform 
they had originally been released on was extinct. 
 
Methodology 
As this study is exploratory in nature, we chose a case study methodological approach. 
We used qualitative and quantitative data. We collected in-depth qualitative data from 
12 executives in the phonographic industry. The data was collected via eight in-depth 
interviews and transcription of four keynote speeches. Non-participant observation and 
participant observation was conducted with a further 40 industry insiders. We collected 
the qualitative data in two phases at music industry conferences: The PopKomm Music 
Conference in Berlin and The Hard Working Class Heroes conference in Dublin. We 
also used industry reports and press releases from 2000 to 2012. 
The quantitative data was collected from The International Federation of the 
Phonographic Industry (IFPI) as well as national representative bodies for the two 
largest recorded music markets- the UK and the USA. We collected sales data from 
Nielsen Soundscan. We conducted statistical correlation tests on overall sales versus 
catalog sales. Variance in change of different sections such as digital sales, physical 
sales, new sales and catalog sales were examined over a 15-year period. We were 
particularly interested in catalogue sales versus new sales and the change in market 
share for incumbent firms versus entrants in the same period. 
 
Main Findings 
Until the 1980s, there was a lot of fragmentation in the phonographic industry. In 1987, 
a “Big 6” group of companies emerged which owned around 85% of the market. After 
this development, people in the industry began using the term major label to describe 
these large organizations with the term indie (independent) labels for those outside of 
this bracket. This “Big 6” was comprised of EMI (Electrical Music Industries) based in 
London, CBS (Columbia Broadcasting Services) which dated back to the 1890s, BMG 
(Bertelsmann Music Group), Polygram, Warner Entertainment Artists (WEA) and 
Music Corporation of America (MCA). In 1991, Japan’s Sony group (SME), who 
wanted to complement its Walkman products, bought out CBS, and MCA became 
Universal Records. In 1998, Polygram merged into Universal and in 2004; Sony bought 
out BMG to make Sony BMG. Until 2011, it was a “Big 4” with Sony BMG, EMI, 
Warner Music Group (WMG) and Universal Music (UM) controlling around 85% of the 
recorded music market globally (Kraslovsky et al, 2007). In 2011, WMG and Universal 
proposed a buyout of the owners of EMI, Citi Group, who had serious financing issues. 
In late 2012, EMI transferred 3% of its holdings to Universal.  
There have been several technological changes in the phonographic industry. 
However, each change up to digital downloading was not radical as they did not change 
routines or boundaries and built on existing competencies of the established firms’ 
marketing, distribution and production.  
The CEO of 7Digital, the second largest digital music sales company in the world, 
gave an insight into the sustaining nature of the recorded music industry up until the 
advent of digital music. The CD was a major change but the incumbent firms and their 
large customers (the retail outlets) in the market supported it. As the above respondent 
alluded to, the technologies used in the phonographic industry prior to digital music 
were a continuation of the same trajectory. The industry used the same distribution 
networks, the same retail partners such as HMV and Tower who simply replaced a 
product using the old technology on their shelves with the new technology. 
We had the Gramophone, and then we had the 8-track, which was popular in the states and was the 
first technology that could be played in a car. Then we had the good old cassette player...we had the 
CD and this was the golden years for the record companies as they could reissue everything on CD 
and they made huge profits... I think people in the industry thought this replacement cycle would 
continue forever and they would bring out new technology and start the cycle again. As we know now, 
unfortunately, that did not happen. (CEO, 7Digital, 2nd largest global digital music provider) 
This system changed once the digital distribution of music started at the beginning of 
the millennium. Physical sales have decreased year on year since overall sales peaked in 
2004. Physical album sales have fallen from 606.2 million units in 2005 to 198 million 
units in 2012. Whereas digital albums have increased from 30 million units in 2005 year 
on year to 252 million units (this figure includes individual track sales equalized at 10 
tracks per album) in 2012. The major labels were and still are the only producers and 
distributors of physical music. This was one of their main specialised complimentary 
assets. The physical distribution channels where the incumbent firms had their power 
have lost a large amount of their value as the amount of units shipped through this 
channel reduced greatly.  
Coinciding with the new digital music technology was the advent of music blogs and 
social media that advised consumers of new tastes. This was important as it took 
another facet of the record companies’ control mechanisms away from them. A music 
blog manager explained that prior to the advent of blogs; consumers discovered music 
through the traditional press and radio. Blogs allowed the consumer to ignore the 
mechanisms by which the record companies asserted their control. 
Before the advent of blogs, especially in America, record companies controlled what 
was put into record stores and what was played on the radio. Then it all changed and all 
of a sudden, record companies did not dictate the way new music was discovered. There 
was this new means of discovery on the Internet, the music blogs. Instead of trying to 
embrace this just like Napster they tried to shut it down. (Online manager, The Hype 
Machine, the World’s largest blog) 
The way people found music had changed and the arrival of websites such as 
MySpace and YouTube allowed artists’ access to consumers directly. All the artists had 
to do was to upload their music on to these or similar sites and let the consumers find 
them.  Popular media referred to this phenomenon as the democratisation of music, as 
the consumer and artist needed no intermediary to reach each other.  
Tripsas (1997) stated that if a firm lost specialized complementary assets in a period 
of radical technological change, then an entrant firm would displace them. In the 
phonographic industry, the new technology clearly depleted the specialised assets of 
promotion and distribution of the four incumbent firms- Universal (UMG), Sony 
(SMG), Warner (WMG) and EMI. There has been a 75% reduction in the distribution of 
physical products in 10 years. As regards promotion, a Nielsen market research survey 
(2011), of 26,644 consumers has found that consumption of music is now very 
fragmented and that 50% of consumers watched music videos online. Prior to the online 
explosion of content, consumers could only find music in record shops, the radio and 
music channels on television. The record labels fully controlled these channels. 
Considering the extant explanations regarding radical technological change, this change 
should have badly affected the incumbent firms in the industry, given that their 
structures and specialized complementary assets were devalued (Teece et al, 1997). 
However, their market share overall, in digital sales, analog sales, current sales and 
catalogue sales have remained relatively constant as figure demonstrates. The average 
variance for the four firms’ market share added together year on year over an 8-year 
period is less than 1%. No entrant has managed to displace the incumbents in the 
industry. 
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We propose that the incumbents survived due to the level of catalogue sales in the 
industry. The high levels of catalogue sales have allowed the incumbents to transition on 
to the new technology and eventually gain competencies in this area. We propose that 
the phenomenon of perpetuating sales is responsible for this situation. The question is 
whether the existing literature of incumbent survival can explain why the above occurs. 
One could argue that catalogue sales are a specialized complementary asset. 
However, there are several flaws to this logic. Not every catalogue product sells units. 
Only some artists who perpetuate in consumers taste sell for an extended period. Other 
artists sell for a small period then stop. This perpetuation in taste is down to a unique 
characteristic of the industry- that after an initial surge and plateau, some products do 
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not diminish hugely in popularity over time. Therefore, the phenomenon of extended 
popularity makes the product an asset. Holding catalogue rights to the product is not an 
asset unless that asset benefits from the previous phenomenon. Teece (1986) stated that 
specialized assets are firm specific. This phenomenon is not specific to any firm or 
group of firms; any record company can harness it. Another established tenet of this 
theory is that specialized complementary assets are technology specific (Rothaermel and 
Hill, 2005; Tripsas, 1997). This perpetuation in taste is not technology specific; for 
example, The Beatles have sold millions of units of digital download, CD, tape and 
vinyl. 
As we discussed, it is the perpetuation in taste that causes a product to be an asset 
and like a specialized complementary asset, the product needs an isolating mechanism 
such as strong copyright to protect it. The difference with the discussions in specialized 
complementary asset literature (Tripsas, 1997; Hess and Rothaermel, 2001) is that they 
discussed any intellectual property such as patent protection. We believe if it was patent 
protection (20 years) and not copyright protection (70 years) used as an isolating 
mechanism in the phonographic industry, the phenomenon would not cause incumbent 
survival to the same extent as it currently does. As patents only last for 20 years, the 
base of protection given to firms by perpetuating taste is reduced. 
It is clear from this case study that strategic alliances and internal R&D competencies 
do not explain what has happened in the phonographic industry. The relevant literature 
discussing alliance networks (Ahuja, 2000; Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002; Rothaermel 
and Thursby, 2007) states that for an incumbent to survive with this tool, they must be 
proactive in creating alliances and add competencies to their own. One can see from 
filings in the court case A & M RECORDS, INC et al. Vs Napster Inc (2000) that the 
industry was not trying to do either for several years after to introduction of digital 
technology. From the 2004 IFPI digital music report, it is clear that the industry began 
exploring alliances after the proliferation of a mainstream digital platform in iTunes. As 
regards, internal R&D capability, it seems from these reports, that firms in the 
phonographic industry had no internal R&D capability whatsoever. 
 
Explaining the perpetuating sales model 
Firstly, one might ask- how connected is catalogue sales to overall sales and does this 
relationship fluctuate year on year? To answer this question we performed a Pearson co-
efficient test of the two variables over an eight-year period. This will answer whether 
they correlate year on year. 
 
Table 1: Overall sales and catalogue sales correlation 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
r = 0.980395 
 
The Pearson Correlation Co-efficient scale ranks from minus one to one (≥-1, ≤1) 
and the two samples scored a correlation of .98, which is an extremely high result. This 
result shows that the phenomenon occurs year on year and is not a statistical anomaly. 
As we have discussed, sales of certain artists remain significant in volume 
continuously. This is due to the phenomenon of perpetuating taste in the industry. 
Unlike, in other industries where a product would have a life cycle and would 
eventually decline in sales (Foster, 1986). Some products in the phonographic industry 
seemingly perpetuate in consumers’ taste, even when the industry transitions on to a 
new technology. Once again, using the example of the Beatles- they had sold 
545,000,000 units by 1971 and the figure as of 7 July 2012 is 2,303,500,000 (RIAA, 
2012). This shows that the popularity of acts such as The Beatles reaches a plateau and 
then does not wane substantially over time. This then manifests itself in perpetuating 
sales. Several respondents in this study discussed that after the development of a new 
platform like digital downloading, the sales of catalogue artists actually increase. The 
Beatles have sold 865,000,000 albums on iTunes in just over one year since their 
licensing on that platform, from March 2011 to July 2012. 
Catalogue sales as a percentage of overall sales have increased by 10% since 2008. 
When it is broken down, there is a larger proportion of the sales coming from digital 
sales. As taste perpetuates, consumers will want the catalogue artists on the new 
platform. Thus, this provides the incumbent firms with relevance and sales with 
consumers using the new technology. Therefore, the incumbents will have automatic 
presence on the new technological platform, even if they do not have any specialized 
assets to complement it. 
As we discussed briefly earlier, copyright is very important for perpetuating sales to 
work as an incumbent survival tool. On average, based on the last eight years, catalogue 
sales make up 41% of overall sales every year. Artists from different decades spanning 
Year Overall 
Sales 
X 
Catalogue 
Sales 
y 
 
2005 618.9 229.5 
2006 558.1 224.2 
2007 505.5 194.1 
2008 428.4 178.8 
2009 373.8 163.9 
2010 326.2 138.9 
2011 330.6 151 
2012 316 155 
Σ 3457.5 1435.4 
70 years make up this 41%. If the span of copyrights were the same as patents which is 
20 years, the pool of catalogue sales that provides incumbents with a radical change 
survival mechanism would be a lot thinner. It would therefore be less effective. As 
copyright is 70 years, it provides a wide array of artists that perpetuate in taste and thus 
a wider base of protection. 
As perpetuating taste allows incumbents to remain an automatic presence on a new 
platform, it gives them the time to develop the specialized assets needed for them to use 
and exploit the new technology. This is quite different to the examples given by 
Rothaermel and Hill (2005), Teece et al (1997) or Tripsas (1997), where there is a need 
for specialized complementary assets in the initial period of technological discontinuity. 
In a perpetuating sales industry, the incumbents do not show these competencies until 
after the technological transition. The 2004 and 2005 IFPI reports show that only at that 
time, when other firms further down the supply chain established structures, did the 
incumbents begin to establish specialized complementary assets. Several of the 
respondents in this study spoke of the routines and structures the incumbents began to 
build from 2007 onwards, which was nearly a decade after the initial technological 
transition. This characteristic is unique to this phenomenon of perpetuating sales; in 
other incumbent survival models, firms must utilize specialized complementary assets 
during the technological transition. This shows that incumbents in this industry show a 
delayed use of Teece’s (1986) dynamic capability. 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) discuss absorptive capacity in relation to R&D 
capability. In an industry displaying signs of perpetuating sales, firms will engage in 
increasing their isolating capacity. It is very difficult for firms to predict firstly which 
artists will be a major hit and secondly whether they will perpetuate in catalogue sales. 
Firms in the phonographic industry have been consolidating for the last 30 years. We 
believe this is because the more isolating mechanisms for products (i.e. copyrights for 
songs) they have, the wider their base will be to benefit from perpetuating catalogue 
artists. As we discussed this phenomenon can be quite random, hence firms must 
prepare as much as possible. This wide base therefore protects the incumbents from 
radical technological change. It does not matter what technology used or what platform 
firms used to sell the product. The important factor is whether a firm has the right to 
benefit from the artists’ sales, if they perpetuate in taste. Characteristics of a 
perpetuating sales model 
 
Table 1- Constructs of perpetuating sales model 
Continuing taste of consumers Consumers demand for certain products 
must not wane substantially over time and 
endure across generations of consumers 
and technologies 
Demand results in sales This taste must manifest itself in 
extended sales over generations 
New Platforms New platforms result in larger 
catalogue sales as consumer want old 
artists on new technology 
Delayed dynamic capability Once incumbents transition to the new 
technology, they begin to apply knowledge 
post transition 
Specialized complementary assets 
learned after technological discontinuity 
Unlike other radical technology 
surviving incumbents, specialized assets 
are learned after the technological 
transition 
Longitudinal isolating mechanism The greater the span of protection the 
better this phenomenon will work for 
incumbent survival. 
Increasing isolating capacity Firms will buy up isolating mechanisms 
to products in order to have a wide base of 
products that perpetuate in taste. 
 
We believe that if an incumbent in an industry that has a perpetuation in the sale of 
products follows the above points, they will survive a radical technological shift 
regardless of their ability to have specialized complementary assets, alliance networks 
or absorptive capacity. 
 
Conclusions 
The major contribution in this paper is that we have developed a new model that 
explains why incumbents survived in this industry and believe any incumbent in an 
industry with perpetuating sales with the factors outlined in our discussion will survive 
radical technological change. It is also clear that extant theories of incumbent survival 
of radical technological change do not explain why the incumbents in the phonographic 
industry survived. We believe that it is applicable to situations other than the 
phonographic industry. The publishing, film and academic journal industries appear to 
have a perpetuation in taste that survives on to new platforms. They also benefit from 
copyright protection, which is important in facilitating a perpetual sales model. 
Rothaermel and Hill (2005) stated that radical technological change with apparent 
adverse effects on incumbents could actually strengthen a firm if they have the 
specialized complementary assets to commercialize the product. With our model, we 
dictate that if a perpetual sales model exists in an industry, the new technology can 
strengthen an incumbent firm even with an apparent lack of specialized complementary 
assets and devalued competencies. This adds a new dimension to reasoning behind 
incumbent survival of radical technological change. 
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